

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500070014-4

UNITED PRESS INFORMATION
29 March 1983

LINCOLN, NE

A former director of the Central Intelligence Agency will testify next week during a public hearing on a resolution calling for a freeze on nuclear weapons, two senators announced Tuesday.

William Colby will appear during an April 5 public hearing on LR49, said its sponsors Sens. Don Wesely of Lincoln and Neligh Sen. John DeCamp. The hearing is scheduled for 7 p.m. in the Capitol.

Wesely said Leo Sartori, former advisor to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, also was expected to testify in support of the nuclear freeze resolution.

Wesely called Sartori "one of many defense experts who have come out publicly in support of a mutual and verifiable freeze."

"This should be a very educational hearing," DeCamp said, urging people to attend. He said he had opposed the resolution before studying it carefully.

Both senators said they considered the nuclear freeze important because the Strategic Air Command base in Bellevue and missile sites in western Nebraska make the state a prime target in case of nuclear attack.

"It's important to remember that we're not advocating a unilateral freeze, nor are we asking anyone to trust the Soviets," Wesely said.

THE NATION
26 MARCH 1983

THE COMPANY & THE COPS THE C.I.A.'S SECRET TIES TO LOCAL POLICE

PHILIP H. MELANSON

Two years ago, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12333, "unleashing" the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct domestic intelligence operations. Civil libertarians have rightly criticized the order for creating the danger of a police state in which the C.I.A., acting on its own or through local police forces, will seek to suppress dissent.

What has not been fully reported is the extent to which the agency has in the past worked with police departments in American cities. If the past is prologue, the President's order not only gives a cachet of legitimacy to such cooperation; it also will encourage its expansion.

Executive Order 12333 authorizes the C.I.A. to conduct "administrative and technical support activities *within* and outside the United States. . . ." (Emphasis added.) This is coupled with a sweeping authorization for all intelligence agencies to "cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and facilities of any agency within the intelligence community." Moreover, intelligence agencies can, under certain circumstances, "participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities."

Prior to this order, it was widely believed that the C.I.A.'s charter, which states that the agency shall exercise no "police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions," barred it from involvement in domestic security matters. When Congress approved

the charter in 1947, it was to operate exclusively as a research and intelligence agency. In the 1970s, the C.I.A. set up several departments, providing equipment and explosives, for example, to return, municipal police departments their intelligence units, information on groups interested, provided C.I.A. use as "cover" and, the agency wanted through

the press in 1972, when the press and several members of Congress got wind of these activities, the agency denied and downplayed them, while continuing to engage in them until the mid-1970s. The agency also cooperated with local police officers in official and unofficial ways.

Although domestic spying by the C.I.A. was reported in the press in the 1970s, given the tight security at the agency's Langley, Virginia, headquarters, all the facts may never be known. However, I have obtained under the Freedom of Information Act a declassified 362-page file that provides numerous examples of C.I.A. involvement with police. The file, titled "Domestic Police Training" (hereinafter referred to as the D.P.T. file), reveals the tip of what must be considered a very large iceberg.

According to the file, the agency cultivated friendships with police officers mainly by entertaining them at its headquarters and occasionally by giving them gifts and money. When a Fairfax County, Virginia, police chief took a vacation in Puerto Rico, he was furnished with a car by the San Juan field office. Nor did the agency forget the cop on the beat. According to the file, one police officer was given a week's vacation at a C.I.A. safe house in Miami; the agency picked up an \$800 car-rental tab for another officer.

Police chiefs and commissioners were frequently given red-carpet treatment at Langley. Invitees to a 1967 get-together were sent identical letters of warm greeting by Howard Osborn, director of the C.I.A.'s Office of Security:

Mr. Helms has a keen, personal interest in our meeting and has directed that such Agency facilities as you may require be put at your disposal. He will host a dinner in your honor on 6 October at the Headquarters Building.

The schedules for the visiting police dignitaries stressed play over work. There were lots of coffee breaks, "get-acquainted sessions," "free time" periods and long cocktail hours—more than enough to take the pain out of the tours and lectures, which usually ran from ten to forty-five minutes. "Recreation periods" took up as much as four hours of the nine-hour workday. Travel arrangements were made by the agency, and limousines and spacious suites at the National Executive Conference Center were available for guests.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-8

WASHINGTON POST
20 MARCH 1983

William E. Colby

Chicken Little Is Back

Chicken Little's last visit to Washington was to proclaim that the discovery of a Soviet "brigade" in Cuba presaged the fall of the sky on our republic. We survived, of course, because the brigade would have been lost in the Miami traffic if it had invaded.

We are treated to a similar display as Congress debates the massive increase of our military personnel in El Salvador from 37 to 55. This is accompanied by an equally ponderous discussion of an increase in the military budget for El Salvador from \$60 million to \$110 million, an amount that can only be found in the Pentagon's petty cash drawer. These potent decisions are equated by critics to the dispatch of a half-million American soldiers to Vietnam and our assumption of the front-line military role in that nation. The administration's rhetoric in response is similarly extreme, as it lays the agonies of El Salvador to the machinations of a Soviet and Cuban master plan.

This hyberbole manages to conceal what is actually a sensible approach by the administration. Far from repeating Vietnam, it is plain that its strategy accepts and incorporates some of the major lessons of Vietnam. When one sees that the sums requested by the administration for security purposes in El Salvador total \$136 million for 1983 and that the request for civilian support totals \$227 million, it is plain that the administration has its priorities correct. Faced with an attempt to overthrow the clear will of the people expressed at the open ballot box only a year ago, it is plain that there is a military requirement for protection. It is plain also that the military requirement is to establish a screen behind which the truly critical work of economic and social development can continue.

The recent extension of the land reform program over the opposition of the right wing, the result of fully democratic, peaceful pressure by the *Unidad Popular Democratica*, shows that the democratic process is at work and that the necessary land reform program will continue.

The administration's program to encourage the development of democratic institutions through overt means has a substantial role in its program for El Salvador. The idea of focusing on two provinces as a start and spreading outward follows the successful oil spot strategy that has been proved effective in many insurgency situations. And the clear position of El Salvador's government and our administration that the United Democratic Front is invited to participate in the coming elections gives it a way of sharing—if not securing—power through the ballot box.

The refusal of the guerrillas to abandon the struggle does not justify an abandonment of the democratic process any more than the intransigence of the Red Brigades or the Baader-Meinhof gang would have justified giving power to them in Italy or Germany. The UDF's well-justified fear of right-wing violence does not change this fact. It does call for special efforts for its protection to induce it to participate. Revolutionary romanticism cannot cover up the fact that the one successful revolution in the region, Nicaragua's, not only has not had an election but baldly states that it will not have one until 1985 because the people cannot be trusted to determine their destiny.

Sensitivity to the very real errors of Vietnam should not focus solely on our overmilitarization of that conflict. It should also reflect the error of our encouragement of the replacement of President Ngo Dinh Diem by a junta of generals in hope that they would be more "democratic" than his Mandarin tradition would accept. Congress' decision to deprive the forces of South Vietnam of the logistics they had been assured of receiving to face the 1975 military assault from the North, after the guerrilla war had been won, was an error that produced half a million refugees in leaky boats.

Sensitivity to error does not require paralysis. The administration's plans, as distinct from its rhetoric, show a sensitivity to the real lesson of insurgency warfare: that the military role is to screen and support the political process, not replace it. It deserves the support of a serious people and Congress. A Chicken Little panic over news that a single American soldier actually carried a weapon somewhere in El Salvador hardly dignifies a great nation, let alone the one on whose will and wisdom its allies depend for their freedom.

The writer, former director of Central Intelligence, directed multiagency advisory teams in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) mission in Vietnam from 1968 to 1971.

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
14 March 1983

WASHINGTON
HARD FOUGHT FREEZE VOTE DUE WEDNESDAY
BY PATRICIA KOZA

A leader of the House drive for a nuclear freeze resolution, telling his colleagues "the whole world is watching," Monday warned President Reagan will go all out to stop the arms cut plan.

Senators, scientists and religious leaders all called on the House to approve the resolution, set for a vote Wednesday, which backs "a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons."

* * * * *

The House Foreign Affairs committee approved a similar resolution last year but it failed by two votes to pass the House after a personal lobbying effort by Reagan. Last week's 27-9 vote came despite last-ditch opposition lobbying by the administration.

Sen. Edward

Kennedy said he hoped a favorable House vote would persuade the Senate, where support is less strong, to pass a freeze resolution of its own.

Noting the Senate version now has 34 sponsors compared with 17 last year, he said passage still is "an uphill battle" but, "I am absolutely convinced we will ultimately be successful."

Other participants at the news conference included former CIA Director William Colby; Dr. Jeremy Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists, and Mike Farrell of "M-A-S-H" fame, a leader in the successful freeze vote in California last November.

Colby called it a "paradox" that the administration claims a freeze would not be verifiable when a report it released last week on the "Soviet threat" contained mountains of evidence of Soviet weapons systems.

"It is precisely a freeze which would stop further buildup of weapons by our two countries," he said.

* * * * *

Other participants at the news conference were Sen. Mark Hatfield, R-Ore., a sponsor with Kennedy of the Senate freeze resolution; Rep. James Leach, R-Iowa; Bishop P. Francis Murphy, auxiliary bishop of Baltimore; Bishop Frederick Wertz of the Washington area United Methodist Church; Rabbi Walter Wurzbarger, president of the Synagogue Council of America; Dr. Helen Caldicott, president of the Physicians for Social Responsibility; Dr. Jerome Wiesner, president emeritus of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and science advisor to John Kennedy, and Randall Kehler, executive director of the National Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign which sponsored a freeze demonstration last week on Capitol Hill.

EXCERPTED

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Morning News

STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE March 14, 1983 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT The National Security Agency

DIANE SAWYER: What do you think is the largest U.S. intelligence agency? If you say the CIA, you're probably not alone in the number of people who say that, but you may be wrong.

Bob Pierpoint now gives us another look at a different gigantic secret agency.

WOMAN: We're doing a story about a federal government agency known as NSA. Do you know what it is and what it does?

MAN: No, I don't.

MAN: NSA? I know, insurance company.

MAN: No, I don't.

MAN: NSA? Nah.

WOMAN: NSA? I never heard of it.

MAN: The NSA.

ROBERT PIERPOINT: Officials of the National Security Agency are not likely to be offended that so few know what it is. In fact, the NSA likes it that way. Behind all this obscurity and steel fencing is an agency considered vital to the safety of this nation. It was founded in 1952 by President Harry Truman in an executive order that to this day is still stamped secret.

Headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, between Washington and Baltimore, the NSA operates quietly in these buildings, under which are said to be acres of the world's most

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500070014-4

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-6

WASHINGTON POST
2 MARCH 1983

Three Plead Guilty to Illegal Exporting Scheme

By Stephen J. Lynton
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former CIA official and two business associates pleaded guilty yesterday to federal criminal charges involving a scheme to export \$5 million worth of diesel engine manufacturing equipment to the Soviet Union.

Paul Sakwa, 59, a former CIA and State Department officer who is now a Washington-based business consultant, and Stephen G. Carter, 46, a Chicago business executive, entered guilty pleas in U.S. District Court in Alexandria to single felony counts of violating U.S. export regulations.

Exports of machinery to the Soviet Union's large Kama River Truck Complex have been barred by U.S. Commerce Department regulations since 1980 in response to Soviet military moves in Afghanistan. The plant is believed to produce equipment used by Soviet forces.

In addition, Gerald F. McCall, 51, a Toronto businessman, pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count of conspiring to submit a false declaration to the U.S. Customs Service in connection with the scheme. The declaration, which was never filed, would have falsely named a Western European country, rather than the Soviet Union, as the ultimate destination for the equipment.

The three men entered their guilty pleas yesterday morning, 35 minutes before they were scheduled to go on trial. As part of a plea agreement, Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph J. Aronica said the government would drop its earlier 11-count indictment, which was returned by a grand jury Jan. 4.

Judge Richard L. Williams set sentencing for April 1. Sakwa and Carter could be sentenced to up to five years' imprisonment and substantial fines. According to prosecutors, the fines may be as high as five times the value of the equipment intended for export—a sum that could amount to millions of dollars. McCall could receive up to a year's imprisonment and a \$1,000 fine.

Mark H. Tuohey III, an attorney for Sakwa, later characterized the charge to which the guilty plea was entered as a "technical violation" and said that Sakwa did not believe at the time the deal was being arranged that he could be violating export rules. "He did not have any intention to violate the law," Tuohey said.

Sakwa, a CIA employee from 1952 to 1962, gained prominence in 1973 when he opposed President Nixon's choice of William E. Colby to head the CIA, criticizing Colby's performance as CIA station chief in Saigon in the early 1960s. Sakwa was a State Department research officer until 1964 when he became a private consultant.

Michael H. Salsbury, a lawyer for Carter, declined to comment. Attorneys for McCall could not be reached for comment.

The charges to which the three men pleaded guilty entailed a complex series of business negotiations, including tape-recorded telephone conversations with undercover investigators posing as prospective purchasers of the equipment. The men were charged with making arrangements to try to sell the machinery to a fictitious company, set up by investigators. The fictitious firm purported to seek to export it to the Soviet Union.